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Abstract. This paper analyzes the properties of Lorenz curves and generalized Lorenz
curves produced from combinations of income distributions. The paper shows that when
sub-populations have equal means, a number of simple conditions govern the position
of the Lorenz curve for the combined population relative to the Lorenz curves for the
sub-populations. These conditions become less regular when the sub-populations have
different means, and suggest that a combined distribution will almost never Lorenz dom-
inate an original distribution. Implications of the results for intertemporal comparisons
of social welfare and inequality are discussed, and are illustrated by comparing income
distributions across generations in Brazil.

1. Introduction
The theoretical foundation for intertemporal and cross-national comparisons of income dis-
tributions has been strengthened by research exploiting the analogy between rankings of income
distributions and rankings of probability distributions in the economics of uncertainty.' This lit-
erature has provided new justification for the use of Lorenz curves as the basis for inequality
comparisons by establishing the relationship between Lorenz dominance and stochastic dominance.
Specifically, this literature proves that for distributions with equal means, the condition that dis-
tribution A Lorenz dominates distribution B is equivalent to the condition that distribution B can
be produced from distribution A by a series of regressive transfers (analogous to mean preserving
spreads), and to the condition that distribution A has higher expected social welfare for any sym-
metric "S-concave" social welfare function. Shorrocks (1983) provides a valuable extension of the
results to distributions with different means, proving that dominance in mean inflated "generalized
Lorenz curves" is formally equivalent to second order stochastic dominance, with all that this im-
plies for rankings of expected social welfare. An important outcome of these results is that they
have served as a foundation for analyzing the consistency between standard measures of inequality
and particular classes of social welfare functions, as in Newbery (1970), Sheshinski (1972), and
Fields and Fei (1976).
As this literature has proven, there is a straightforward correspondence between changes in
Lorenz curves and changes in social welfare when there are redistributions of income in the pop-
ulation. Actual changes in income distributions, however, often occur for reasons other than the
direct income transfers which provide the theoretical basis for welfare based inequality comparisons.
One important source of change in the distribution of income is changes in population composition
due to migration or natural increase. A large class of demographic and economic phenomena can
be represented as additions of new entrants into some initial population. This paper explores the
implications of changing population composition on inequality and social welfare by analyzing the
general properties of Lorenz curves and generalized Lorenz curves produced from combinations of
populations. The results have important implications for analysis of the economic effects of popula-
tion growth, the distributional effects of which have been debated in both theoretical and empirical
research.2
The paper begins by identifying the position of the generalized Lorenz curve for a combined
population relative to the generalized Lorenz curves of two original sub-populations. It is shown
that the generalized Lorenz curve for a combined distribution is always less than or equal to a
weighted average of the generalized Lorenz curves for the original populations, always lies between
the original curves if they do not intersect, and intersects each of the original curves exactly as
many times as the original curves intersect. Drawing on Shorrocks' proof of the direct relationship
between generalized Lorenz curves and second order stochastic dominance, these results are used
1 The seminal contribution is Atkinson (1970), with extensions by Rothschild arnd Stiglits (1973) and Dasgupta,
Sen and Starrett (1973). A useful survey of the results is provided by Kakwani (1980).
2 See Lam (1987) for a survey of this literature.
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to analyze the apparent changes in social welfare implied by changes in population composition
over time.
The paper then analyzes the properties of standard Lorenz curves for combined distributions,
demonstrating that the Lorenz curve for the combined population must be less than or equal
to a weighted average of the original Lorenz curves. Beyond this fundamental inequality the
results for generalized Lorenz curves do not extend directly to standard Lorenz curves when the
sub-populations have different means. Most importantly, the paper proves that the combined
distribution will Lorenz dominate the original distribution if and only if the entering population
has the same mean as the original distribution and itself Lorenz dominates the original distribution.
The theoretical results are illustrated by comparing the income distribution for Brazilian males
with the hypothetical income distribution implied by assigning boys ages 0-15 the incomes of
their fathers. A literal comparison of the generalized Lorenz curves and standard Lorenz curves
for the two populations implies an unambiguous deterioration in expected social welfare across
generations, but an ambiguous change in income inequality. The paper concludes by pointing out
the ambiguities inherent in welfare interpretations of intertemporal changes in the distribution of
income under changing population composition.
2. Lorenz Curves, Generalized Lorenz Curves, and Social Welfare
The Lorenz curve plots cumulative shares of income as a function of cumulative population
shares when individuals are ranked in increasing order of income. Given an income distribution
with probability density function f(y), the horizontal axis for the Lorenz curve is the cumulative
distribution function F(Q) = fo' f(y)dy. The vertical axis is the first moment distribution function
(9) = } ff(y)dy, where y is the mean of the distribution. Since a = f(y) and a( -
, a convenient property is that
V[F~) d [F'(y)] y-'[FIy)] =)] -. (1)
dF(y) yt
For some purposes, including analysis of the extreme points, it is analytically convenient and con-
ceptually appropriate to recognize the discreteness of individuals in the distribution. The discrete
analog to (1) is
[F(y))- -y-1(2)
F(yk) - F(y-1) y
where yk is the income of the kth person in the rank ordered distribution. Since the marginal
income is by construction non-decreasing in F(y), the slope of the Lorenz curve is everywhere
non-decreasing. Particular attention will be given to the slope of the Lorenz curve as F -+ 0 and
F -+ 1. Following (2), the slope of the curve out of the origin is g--, where y~i is the income
of the poorest person in the population, assumed to be non-negative. The slope approaching the
upper right hand corner is " ,where yrna" is the income of the richest person in the population.
In addition to Lorenz curves as traditionally defined, this paper analyzes the "generalized
Lorenz curve," defined by Shorrocks (1983) as pt(F), the conventional Lorenz curve scaled up by
2
mean income. Note from (1) and the definition that the slope of Shorrocks' generalized Lorenz curve
at some F is y(F). Given Shorrocks' demonstration of the relationship between generalized Lorenz
curves and comparisons of social welfare for distributions with different means, the generalized
Lorenz curve is interesting in its own right, and, as will be seen below, is a useful tool in analyzing
combined distributions.
Since the cases being considered in this paper necessarily involve changing population size,
social welfare comparisons will be based on per capita social welfare. The analysis thus assumes
the existence of per capita social welfare functions W, defined over the probability density function
of the income distribution such that W(fi) = PW(f=) for any population size P. This is consistent
with Shorrocks (1983), and assumes a restriction to social welfare functions which satisfy the
"symmetry axiom for population" defined by Dasgupta et al. (1973) . A preference for equity
is assumed, formalized by restricting attention to the class of symmetric S-concave social welfare
functions, also defined in Dasgupta et al. (1973). Social welfare comparisons will draw on Shorrocks'
(1983) Theorem 2, which establishes that
W(f=) :5W(f;) VW if pMi;(F)I<p, l(F) VF, (3)
where W is any S-concave social welfare function.
These assumptions about social welfare comparisons do not imply that a measure of per capita
social welfare is the appropriate way to evaluate demographic changes such as increases or decreases
in * fertility. One of the fundamental issues underlying the analysis here, but hardly resolved by
it, is how to make welfare evaluations of the introduction of new (possibly unborn) members into a
population. This is a philosophical issue far beyond the scope of this paper,3 but the issue should
be kept in mind in interpreting the results below.
The proofs of the equivalence between the rankings of income distributions by Lorenz curves
or generalized Lorenz curves and the rankings by social welfare functions strengthen the theoretical
motivation for intertemporal and cross-national comparisons of income distributions. Increased
confidence in the economic content of such comparisons may be misplaced, however, if the purely
demographic component of changes in income distributions is substantial. Changes in the income
distribution due to differential fertility across income classes, for example, may be observationally
equivalent to changes caused by progressive or regressive transfers.4 The welfare implications of
differential fertility, however, are much less straightforward than the welfare implications of regres-
sive transfers, suggesting that the clearer welfare interpretation of income distribution comparisons
provided by Atkinson and Shorrocks may be partially illusory. The following sections clarify the
problem by formally analyzing the changes in social welfare and inequality implied by the intro-
duction of new individuals into an existing population.
a See Nerlove,. Rasin, and Sadka (1987) for a recent survey of the issue and important theoretical contributions.
4 See L am (1986).
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3. Generalized Lorenz Curves for Combined Distributions
Consider an initial population with an income distribution defined by the density function
f1 (y) to which we introduce a second population with income distribution f2a(y), producing the
combined density function f3 (y) = pi fi(y) + (1 - pi)f2(y), where pi is the first population's
share in the combined population. We seek to identify restrictions on the relative position of the
combined population's Lorenz curve and generalized Lorenz curve. This will make it possible to
answer such questions as whether the combined population can ever have unambiguously higher or
unambiguously lower expected social welfare than the original population and whether the combined
population can have an unambiguously more equal or unambiguously less equal distribution of
income than the original population.
Since the marginal incomes for each distribution at a given value on the c.d.f. are important
to the results below, it follows by construction of the c.d.f. for the combined population that
min [yi(F), y2(F)] y3 (F) < max [yi(F),y 2 (F)]. (4)
Recall from (1) that these marginal incomes are the slopes of the generalized Lorenz curves at a
given F. The p.d.f. and c.d.f. for the combined distribution are simply weighted averages of the
p.d.f.s and c.d.f.s of the original distributions, with weights equal to the population shares. It does
not follow, however, that the (generalized) Lorenz curve for the combined population is a weighted
average of the original (generalized) Lorenz curves. In fact, the position of the generalized Lorenz
curve for the combined population is governed by the following fundamental inequality:
Theorem 1. p s3(F) pp11(F)-+(1- pi)p2 Q2(F) V F, with the equality holding wherever
y3 (F) = y2(F) = y1(F).
Proof: Following Atkinson (1970), integration by parts implies that
=i-j()  y s- F F(y)dy. (5)
Using this result and the fact that F3 (y) = pi F1 i(y) + (1 - pi)F2 (y), the generalized Lorenz curve
for the combined distribution can be reduced to
p/A3 (F) = p1 p1  (F) + (1 - p)p2
+Pi #[(y - y) - Fi(y)dyr- + (1 - P1)[r(ya- y2)_- F2(y) dy (6)
JY1 1
Regardless of the signs of ya - y1 and y/a - y/2, the two terms in brackets on the right-hand side of
(6) must be non-positive, establishing the inequality in Theorem 1.5 Since the last two terms in
5 A similar result can be found using standard Lorens curves in an unpublished paper by Satchell (1984), who
provides a considerably different proof.
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(6) go to zero when y3 = y2 = y1, a sufficient (but not necessary) condition to satisfy the equality
in Theorem 1 is that y3 = y2 = y1.*
If the two original generalized Lorenz curves do not intersect, Theorem 1 insures that the
generalized Lorenz curve for the combined population never lies above the dominant generalized
Lorenz curve. Given the result in (3), Theorem 1 has the following implications for social welfare
comparisons:
If W(fi) < W(f 2 ) VW then. W(fs) < W(f 2) VW. (7)
If distribution 2 has higher expected social welfare than distribution 1 for any S-concave social
welfare function, a combination of the two distributions will never have higher expected welfare
than distribution 2.7 It will be proven below that "generalized Lorenz dominance" by one of
the original distributions is a necessary and sufficient condition for the combined distribution to
have unambiguously lower expected social welfare than the dominating original distribution. It
cannot be proven based on Theorem 1, however. Indeed, the rankings implied by Theorem 1 are
quite limited. In and of itself it implies little more than that the generalized Lorenz curve for
the combined population can never lie above both of the original generalized Lorenz curves, with
corresponding implications for welfare comparisons.
Further rankings can be established by identifying the relative positions of the three generalized
Lorenz curves when the two original curves do not intersect.
Theorem 2. p "(F){F }pfF ) VP iff p g(F){ yg(F) VF i,j= 1,2.
Proof: Atkinson (1970) proves that for distributions with the same mean, Lorenz dominance is
equivalent to second order stochastic dominance. Extending the result to the case of different
means-and thus to generalized Lorenz curves-the generalization of Atkinson's theorem is
p1(F) - pyi (F) > 0 VF if f [F.(y) - F1(y)] dy > 0 V5. (8)
0
Evaluating (8) for the case of p3 P3 - p @, and using the fact that F3 = piF + (1- pi)F, the
condition reduces to
p ) -p;(P)> 0 VP if"f [F;(y) - F(y)]dy 0 V . (9)
6 From (4), ys = ya= yf2 iff yi = y12, so recalling (1), the three marginal incomes will be equal if and only if
the slopes of the generalised Lorens curves are equal at F.
7 It is important to emphasise that there is no "diversification" involved in the combination of distributions
considered here. The combinations are like pouring two lottery urns into a single urn, rather than offering
linear combinations of draws from separate urns.
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By (8), the right hand side of (9) will be satisfied if and only if p;4,-(F) p, (F) VF. Repeating
the step with the inequality reversed leads directly to Theorem 2.8
Theorem 2 imposes a number of restrictions on the relative position of the generalized Lorenz
curve for the combined population. It implies, for example, that the generalized Lorenz curve for
the combined population lies everywhere below one of the original generalized Lorenz curves if and
only if it lies everywhere above the other generalized Lorenz curve. It follows that
i 1 i(F) <p 3 43 (F) < p2Ii 2 (F) VF iff pit(F) < p 2 t 2 (F) VF. (10)
The generalized Lorenz curve for the combined distribution lies everywhere between the the original
generalized Lorenz curves if and only if the original generalized Lorenz curves do not intersect.
Given Shorrocks' result in (3), this in turn implies that
W(fi) W(f 3 ) W(f 2) VW if W(fi) W(f 2 ) VW. (11)
where W is any S-concave social welfare function.
Theorem 2 implies that regardless of the relative positions of the original generalized Lorenz
curves, it can never be the case that the generalized Lorenz curve for the combined population lies
everywhere below both of the original generalized Lorenz curves. That is, it must always be true
that
pL3 a (F) min [,11(P),p2 @2 (f)] for some F. (12)
While this result may not seem surprising, the same condition is not true for standard Lorenz
curves, as will be shown below. Note that (12) in turn implies that the combined distribution can
never be unambiguously inferior to both of the original distributions in the sense of having lower
expected social welfare for all S-concave social welfare functions.
4. Intersecting Generalized Lorenz Curves
A further corollary of Theorem 2 is that if the original generalized Lorenz curves intersect,
then the generalized Lorenz curve for the combined distribution must intersect both of the original
curves. This can be proven by noting that any counterexample is directly refuted by Theorem 2.
We can go further, however, in identifying the relative positions of the generalized Lorenz curves
in the case of intersections:
T heoremn 3. If p11 and 22 intersect n times, then pA - -intersects each of the original curves
exactly n times.
Proof: The first step is to prove that pa3 a must cross each original curve at least once for every
crossing of the original curves. Denote the value of F at the jth crossing of the original curves
as F'. Consider the last intersection, assumed to occur at F", as shown in Figure 1 for the case
8 Note that (8) also leads directly to the result in (3), providing an alternative proof of Shorrocks' Theorem 2.
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of two intersections. Since p; (Ds(1) = p , the curve for the distribution with the higher mean
crosses the curve for the distribution with the lower mean from below at F". Suppose, then, that
i ; p2 and that piu i intersects p2 2 from below at F", as in Figure 1. This requires that
p " 2 (F"), and therefore (F") > y2(F"). Denoting the (n - 1)th intersection by
f" 1, the mean value theorem requires that there exists some F"-1" E [f"-1, F"], such that
pA ,1 i (Pn-1n_2) = p2 2(F"~1n). By Theorem 1, equal slopes of the generalized Lorenz curves
imply that
pa a(F"~1'") = p1 piAi(P-'-") + (1 - p1 )p 2 1 2 (P"~ 1 '") (13)
Since p3 (P3 must lie between the two original curves at F"-1'" by (13), must be less than
or equal to them at F" by Theorem 1, and must be intermediate to them at F = 1, p3 c 3 must
intersect p1 1 from above in the interval [P"-' F"], and must intersect P242 from below in the
interval [F",1]. Now suppose that F"- 0, implying that the original curves cross at least twice,
with p2(2 > p1,1 in the interval [F"- 1 , F"]. Then there exists some Fn- 2 ,n-1 E [f"- 2 , F"- 1] at
which the slopes of the two original curves are equal, requiring that p34 3 lie between the original
curves at that point. The same logic as above requires that pA3c must intersect P2A2 from above
in the interval [(F-2, Fn-1 and must intersect pi i from below in the interval [f"-', F"]. By
induction, every additional intersection of the original curves implies that p3 43 intersects each of
the original curves at least one additional time.
It can now be shown that the curve for the combined population intersects each of the original
curves exactly n times, with the n intersections whose existence was proven above being the only
intersections. The proof follows from the following property of the generalized Lorenz curve for
the combined population: If p3I1P cuts one of the original curves from above, it cannot cut the
same curve from below without first crossing the other curve. To see this, suppose there did
exist such a pair of intersections, with p 3s( crossing P2 2 from above at some FA, and from
below at some FB, with piu i > p2(2 VF E [FA,FE]. Then there is some F^'AB e [FAFB ] at
which p3 (P'AB) < p 2 42 (PA'B) and v3 (PA'B) = y2 (PA'), with y3 < y2 to the left of A,B
and y3 > y2 to the right of A,B. But given the condition in (4) that y3 E [yi, 3/21, these slope
conditions can only hold ify1 y3 <3/2 to the left of PA'1 and y1 y3 > y2 to the right of pA ,B*
This slope reversal, in turn, can only be true if all three curves have identical slopes at FA'. But
from (6), p03 a3 must lie between the two original curves wherever they have equal slopes. It is thus
impossible for p3 4P3 to cross P2 4P2 from above and then from below in any interval in which Pi i
and p2 2 do not cross.
By Theorem 1, pa~ can never intersect the higher of the two original curves in any interval.
As inspection of Figure 1 makes clear, any intersection of pacL' with either of the original curves
in addition to the n intersections whose existence was proven above would require that p3 cL' cross
the lower of the two original curves from above and then below without crossing the other curve
at some intermediate value. Since this has been proven impossible, the curve for the combined
population must cross each of the original curves exactly n times.
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The ability to identify the number of intersections of generalized Lorenz curves, and to identify
the order of the curves in particular regions, can be extremely useful in analyzing the rankings which
would be given to each distribution by particular social welfare functions or inequality measures.
Davies and Hoy (1985), for example, use the criterion of third degree stochastic dominance to
provide additional orderings of income distributions beyond those provided by Lorenz dominance.
Their results suggest that the ability to prove that one generalized Lorenz curve lies initially below
a second curve and intersects it only once would be useful information in attempting to make
welfare comparisons across distributions. Unfortunately, it will be seen below that the tidy results
established here for generalized Lorenz curves do not extend to standard Lorenz curves.
5. Implications for Intertemporal Comparisons of Social Welfare
Consider a researcher examining changes in the distribution of income over time by comparing
generalized Lorenz curves for two periods. Under what conditions will the distribution indicate an
unambiguous improvement in social welfare? Suppose that between the two periods the difference
between departures from a population (due to deaths, retirements, or out-migration) and entrants
into a population (due to births, entry into labor force, or in-migration) produce a "net entrants"
population with a non-negative density at every income level.9 In a growing population it may be
reasonable to assume that the population in the second period can be thought of as the original
population plus a group of new entrants. The results above, then, imply the following:
The second period distribution has unambiguously higher social welfare than the first period
distribution if and only if the new entrants have unambiguously higher social welfare then the first
period population. It is possible for the new entrants to have a mean income lower than the first
period mean income and still have unambiguously higher social welfare, as can be seen by analogy
to the uncertainty literature. It is a necessary condition for increased social welfare, however, that
the minimum income among the new entrants not be less than the minimum income in the original
population.
It is also possible for the second period distribution to imply unambiguously higher social
welfare in cases in which the new entrants have an unambiguously less equal distribution in the
sense that the Lorenz curve for the new entrants lies everywhere below the original Lorenz curve.
In this case it is a necessary condition that the new entrants' mean income exceed the original
mean. If the new entrants have both a lower mean and an unambiguously less equal distribution,
then the second period populations must have unambiguously lower social welfare.
6. Properties of Lorenz Curves for Combined Distributions
If the two original distributions have identical means, the results of the previous sections apply
directly to standard Lorenz curves. Given equal means, "expected social welfare" and "equality"
may be considered formally equivalent for many purposes, with the precise sense in which this is
* If there are more departures than entrants at some income levels then the density for the "entering population"
will be negative at some points, and the proofs above will not hold in general.
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true clarified by Atkinson (1970), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973) and others. When mean incomes
differ between two populations, then the equivalence of equality, as traditionally defined, and social
welfare breaks down. One reading of Shorrock's theoretical results is that the Lorenz curve and
inequality measures based on it should be abandoned in such a case in favor of Shorrocks' mean
inflated generalized Lorenz curves, since the latter map directly into rankings of social welfare.
As important as Shorrocks' results are, however, it is unlikely that the concept of scale-neutral
inequality will be discarded by economists or other social scientists. The independence of inequality
measures from mean income has long been axiomatic in the analysis of inequality,10 and researchers
will continue to analyze trends in inequality independent of changes in mean income.
What can be said, then, about the changes in inequality that will be observed when two
populations are combined, using the Lorenz curve as the basis for inequality comparisons? If the
two populations have equal means, then all of the results derived above can be applied directly. For
example, if pi = p2, then Theorem 2 establishes that the Lorenz curve for the combined population
must lie everywhere between the two original Lorenz curves if the original Lorenz curves do not
intersect. This result need not hold for standard Lorenz curves when the means of the original
populations differ, however. In order to analyze the relative positions of the Lorenz curves, it is
possible first to establish some results for generalized Lorenz curves which do extend to standard
Lorenz curves. Rewriting the result in Theorem 1,
P3 (F) ; xr141(F) + (1 - 2rx)@2 (F) VF, (14)
where ir, = (pipi )/p3, the share of total income accounted for by the first sub-population. Whereas
the generalized Lorenz curve for the combined population was shown to be less than or equal to a
population-share weighted average of the original generalized Lorenz curves, the standard Lorenz
curve for the combined population is less than or equal to an income-share weighted average of the
original Lorenz curves. This has important implications, since it means that the relative position
of the Lorenz curve for the combined population will be affected in complex ways by the relative
incomes of the two sub-populations.
Beyond the requirement implied by (14) that the Lorenz curve for the combined population can
never lie above the maximum of the original Lorenz curves, the restrictions on the relative position
of Lorenz curves are more ambiguous than the restrictions on the relative position of the generalized
Lorenz curves. It is not true, for example, that the Lorenz curve for the combined population must
lie between the original Lorenz curves if the original Lorenz curves do not intersect. It is also not
true that the Lorenz curve for the combined population can never lie everywhere below both of the
original Lorenz curves.
Is it possible to add individuals to a population so that the new combined distribution is
unambiguously more equal than the original distribution? Formally, under what conditions will
the combined distribution, f3, Lorenz dominate the initial distribution, fi, recognizing from (14)
10 See Kakwani's (1980) survey, for example.
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that the combined distribution can never Lorenz dominate both fs and f2? The answer is that the
conditions are surprisingly restrictive:
Theorem 4. If ym"' > 0, then
Q1 (F) : 43(F) s2 (F) VF if p2 =P1 and Q1 (F) Q2 (F) VF.
The. combined population's income distribution will Lorenz dominate the original population's in-
come distribution if and only if the entering population has the same mean as the original population
and the income distribution of the entering population Lorenz dominates the original population's
income distribution.
Proof: The first step is to establish the necessary condition that p2 = p1. Since '@, (0) = 0 and
(1) = 1, in order for tI3 to Lorenz dominate #I1 it must be true that i ;> >VP as F -- 0 and that
'a < '1 as F -+ 1. By (2) this implies that
*min Ymin max maa
ya- 1 and >--  . (15)
p3 p1 Pa 1
The addition of f implies the introduction of new individuals to a population while leaving the
incomes of the original members unchanged, so it must be the case that
y3""" < y1""" and y3"'' > y1"''". (16)
From the inequality conditions in (16) it is clear that the two conditions in (15) cannot both be
satisfied for any p3 # p1 as long as y"n" >0.11
Several implications of (15) and (16) are worth noting. If pa > si (implying p2 > pA), (16)
requires that y3"m"/p3 < y" /p, implying that 3 must lie below 4k, out of the origin. By the
same logic, if pa < p1, the new Lorenz curve must lie below the original Lorenz curve as F -+ 1.
If the extreme incomes remain constant, a change in the mean must imply that to intersects (1.
Since the slopes at the corners are the. extreme incomes divided by the mean, the slopes at both
F -+ 0 and F -+ I must change in the same direction when the mean changes if ymn and yma
remain constant. But since (a = 1 at F = 0 and F = 1, the slope of 43 cannot be greater than
(less than) the slope of (1 at both endpoints unless 43 intersects #1. Specifically, if the extreme
incomes remain constant and p3 > pi, the first intersection must be #1 intersecting a from below.
If the extreme incomes remain constant and P3 < pi, the last intersection must be #1 intersecting
afrom above. If either ys" or ma''xle outside the range [yin "y'""], it is ossible for the
new Lorenz curve to lie everywhere below the original Lorenz curve. What must be true if pa $ #
" If y?"~ = 0 it is possible to raise the mean without lowering the share of income to the poorest individuals
in the population, since their shares are already at zero. This introduces additional conditions for Lorenz
dominance, involving Lorenz curves which initially coincide with the horizontal axis. The result is similar to
the perverse properties Lorens curves exhibit when negative incomes are included. We therefore extend the
usual restriction against negative incomes to exclude incomes at exactly zero as well.
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is that 4I3 (F) < 91(F) over some range of F. This analysis tells us not only the conditions under
which the combined distribution will Lorenz dominate the original distribution, but tells us also
about the relative positions of the Lorenz curves in the case of intersections. As pointed out above
in the case of generalized Lorenz curves, knowledge that one Lorenz curve must lie below a second
Lorenz curve out of the origin can be useful in assessing the rankings which would be given by
different inequality measures.
Given equal means, it follows directly from (10) that
S(F) < 3 (F) < # 2 (F) VF iff 4i(F) < 0 2 (F) VF. (17)
Given equal means, it is both necessary and sufficient that f2 Lorenz dominate f1 in order that f3
Lorenz dominate fi. Since we have proven the necessary condition that the two populations have
the same mean, the proof of Theorem 4 is complete.
Theorem 4 demonstrates that the restrictions on the relative position of the generalized Lorenz
curves established in Theorems 2 and 3 do not extend directly to standard Lorenz curves. In contrast
to the result for generalized Lorenz curves, there is no necessary relationship between the number
of intersections of #1 and @2 and the number of intersections of 41 and 3, except when si = p2.
Both parts of the proof of Theorem 3 on intersections break down for standard Lorenz curves.
First, it is not the case for Lorenz curves that equal slopes of the original curves require that the
combined curve be intermediate to the original curves at that point. We therefore cannot establish
that an intersection in the original curves implies that the curve for the combined distribution
intersects both original curves. Second, there is no restriction that the slope of the Lorenz curve
for the combined distribution must be intermediate to the slopes of the original Lorenz curves. The
restrictions which hold are that y3(F) E [yi(F), y2 (F)] and A E [p1, p2]. Since the slope of the
Lorenz curve is y /I;, it is possible for the slope of 41 to be either greater or smaller than the
slopes of both #1 and 42. This means the restriction derived in the proof of Theorem 3 that the
combined curve can not cross another curve from above and below consecutively does not hold in
the case of Lorenz curves, except when p1 = p2.
Unlike the case for generalized Lorenz curves, it is clearly possible for the Lorenz curve for the
combined distribution to lie everywhere below both of the original Lorenz curves. In other words,
while the combined population can never have unambiguously lower expected social welfare than
both of the original populations, the combined population can have an unambiguously less equal
distribution than both of the original populations. The simplest example is the case in which the two
populations are each purely egalitarian but have different means. The combined distribution must
be unambiguously more unequal than either of the original distributions, with the Lorenz curve
(consisting simply of two line segments with slopes equal to the ratio of the sub-population mean to
the combined mean) lying everywhere below the original egalitarian Lorenz curves. The combined
population will have unambiguously higher (lower) expected social welfare than the distribution
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with the lower (higher) mean, however, a simple demonstration of the non-equivalence of inequality
rankings and social welfare rankings under different means.
7. Implications for Inequality Comparisons
As above, it is instructive to consider the implications of these results for analysis of changes
in inequality in a population over time, continuing to assume that the second period population
can be thought of as the original population plus a group of new entrants. By Theorem 4, if the
population of new entrants has a mean income different than the initial mean income, then either
the Lorenz curve for the second period lies everywhere below the original Lorenz curve or the
Lorenz curve for the second period intersects the original Lorenz curve. Even if progressive income
transfers occur between periods, the effect of the new entrants creates a tendency to reject the
hypothesis of a decline in inequality.' 2
The results also apply to changes which are not simply the result of new persons entering
the population. Consider the transfer of an individual from one income level to another, due,
for example, to rural-urban migration.13 It is easy to prove with generalized Lorenz curves that a
transfer of an individual upward (downward) in the income distribution will unambiguously increase
(decrease) social welfare for any concave social welfare function, with the ex post generalized Lorenz
curve dominating (dominated by) the original generalized Lorenz curve. By Theorem 4, however,
the transfer of an individual in either direction will always produce intersecting Lorenz curves if the
extreme incomes in the distribution remain constant. This implies that some inequality measure
will always find the upward mobility of an individual disequalizing, in spite of the fact that it is
an unambiguous Pareto improvement. Swamy (1967), Robinson (1976), Fields (1979), and Stark
and Yitzhaki (1982) provide examples of this effect with particular inequality measures, and show
that sufficiently large transfers upward will eventually have an equalizing effect. The more general
results here demonstrate that such transfers will always produce intersecting Lorenz curves, so that
even though a particular measure shows a decline in inequality, there always exists some alternative
measure which will show an increase in inequality.
8. Comparing Income Distributions of Fathers and Sons in Brazil
The theoretical results proven above can be illustrated by considering what would happen
to the distribution of income across generations if every son received the same income as his
12 See Lam (1986) for a more complete analysis of the effects on inequality comparisons of income differentials in
fertility. Morley (1981) also points out the confusing effects of new entrants into the population on standard
inequality measures.
13A number of economists, including Swamy (1967), Robinson (1976), Fields (1979), and Stark and Yitahaki
(1982) have demonstrated that transferring individuals from a low income class to a higher income class can
cause inequality measures to show initial increases in inequality, followed by decreases in inequality as the
higher income class increases in relative size. Fields (1979) shows that in a two sector economy a transfer of
an individual from the poor sector to the rich sector will produce a Lorens curve which intersects the original
Lorens curve. His example is easily understood given the results above. It is a simple special case of the result
established in Theorem 4 that if the minimum and maximum incomes remain constant between period 1 and
period 2, any change in the mean income between the two periods implies that the Lorens curves for the two
periods intersect.
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father. The specific case considered is Brazil, a developing country which has experienced relatively
high rates of population growth, has been the focus of a major debate over trends in inequality,
and has excellent micro data. Without making any pretext of constructing a complete model of
intergenerational transmission of inequality, it is instructive simply to assign sons the income of
their fathers and compare the Lorenz curves and generalized Lorenz curves for the fathers' and
sons' income distributions.
Assigning fathers' incomes to their sons would not generate a significant change in the dis-
tribution of income in the absence of a systematic relationship between income and fertility. The
exercise becomes interesting because of the fairly substantial differences in fertility across income
levels in Brazil. As shown in Lam (1986), for example, Brazilian men in the the highest income
quintile of the 40-45 age group averaged 4.9 total births, while men in the lowest income quintile
of the same age group averaged 6.2 total births. The experiment here, then, is simply to compare
the income distribution for men to the same distribution when it is weighted by the number of sons
born to each man.'4
Figure 2 plots the generalized Lorenz curves for fathers and sons in Brazil based on the 1976
income distribution for men aged 30-45 and for boys 0-15 when they are assigned the incomes of
their fathers. 5 As can be seen directly from the upper corner of the generalized Lorenz curves, the
fathers' distribution has a higher mean than the sons, the natural result of the negative relationship
between father's income and fertility shown in Lam (1986). The negative correlation between
income and fertility is sufficiently strong, in fact, to cause the generalized Lorenz curve for fathers
to lie everywhere above the generalized Lorenz curve for sons. Following Shorrocks, this implies that
the fathers' distribution will have higher expected social welfare for any S-concave social welfare
function. Whether it is appropriate to infer an unambiguous deterioration in social welfare purely
as a result of fertility behavior is obviously problematic. What Figure 2 demonstrates is the effects
on generalized Lorenz curves of differential fertility alone, with neither progressive nor regressive
transfers across the population of sons.
Figure 3 shows the conventional Lorenz curves for Brazilian fathers and sons, based on the
same distributions used in Figure 2. Unlike the generalized Lorenz curves, the conventional Lorenz
curves intersect, implying that no unambiguous inequality rankings can be made between the
two distributions. The theoretical results derived above make this outcome entirely transparent.
Although every man in the original distribution was not necessarily a father, implying that some
points in the original density may have gone unreplaced in the second generation, in fact the
experiment provides a very close approximation to the hypothetical mixing of distributions analyzed
formally above. The extreme incomes for sons are the same a.s the extreme incomes for fathers.
Since the mean falls across generations, the results above require not only that the Lorenz curves
14 The number of Sons iS used, rather than the number of children, in order to approximate a second generation
male population. A similar exercise could be applied to couples and all children, but subtleties in the treatment
of female labor force participation greatly complicate such an exercise.
"~ The data are taken from the 1976 Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra Domiciliar (PNAD), a survey of 99,167
households conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica.
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must cross, but require also that the sons' Lorenz curve lies above the fathers' curve at the bottom
and lies below the fathers' curve at the top of the distribution. In Figure 3, these requirements
are satisfied in the simplest possible way, by a single intersection. This single intersection is not a
theoretical restriction, and any number of intersections would have been consistent with the basic
facts of the distribution, as long as the sons' Lorenz curve started above and ended below the
fathers' Lorenz curve. The fact that the sons' Lorenz curve initially cuts the fathers' Lorenz curve
from below means that the sons' distribution is more likely to be judged more equal by inequality
measures that are highly sensitive to transfers at the bottom of the distribution, such as the log
variance or Atkinson's index with a high degree of "relative inequality aversion."
It goes without saying that the intergenerational transmission of inequality is far more complex
than sons taking on the incomes of their fathers. Figures 2 and 3 provide a warning, however, of the
changes in income distributions that can be induced purely by demographic factors. In the typical
case in which lower income is associated with higher fertility, Figure 2 suggests that real wage
increases, which would lead to generalized Lorenz dominance in an unchanging population, may be
overcome by the tendency for differential fertility to lower the generalized Lorenz curve. Figure 3
similarly suggests that progressive or regressive transfers, which would imply Lorenz dominance of
one period over another in'an unchanging population, may be lost in the intersecting Lorenz curves
that are created by differential fertility.
9. Conclusions
Lorenz curves have received renewed attention as a basis for inequality comparisons by proofs
of the equivalence between rankings of income distributions by Lorenz dominance and rankings
by concave social welfare functions. This paper demonstrates that caution should be used in
such comparisons due to the sensitivity of Lorenz curves to changes in population composition.
The paper establishes several general properties of Lorenz curves and generalized Lorenz curves
produced from combinations of distributions. For generalized Lorenz curves, the conditions on
the curve for the combined distribution are quite orderly. The generalized Lorenz curve for the
combined distribution is always less than or equal to a weighted average of the original curves,
always lies between the original curves when the original curves do not intersect, and intersects
each of the original curves exactly the same number of times as the original curves intersect.
The results for standard Lorenz curves are less regular, and reveal the inherently ambiguous
nature of intertemporal inequality comparisons. The paper proves that the Lorenz curve for the
combined distribution is always less than or equal to the highest of the two original Lorenz curves.
Beyond this, few restrictions on the Lorenz curves can be made when the means of the original
populations differ. An important result is that the combined distribution will Lorenz dominate
the initial distribution if and only if the entering population has an identical mean income and
itself Lorenz dominates the initial distribution. If the highest and lowest incomes in the initial
population remain constant, any change in the population which alters mean income will produce
a new Lorenz curve which intersects the original Lorenz curve.
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Income distributions for fathers and sons in Brazil demonstrate the theoretical results. Assign-
ing sons the incomes of their fathers, the second generation generalized Lorenz curve lies everywhere
below the generalized Lorenz curve for fathers. The standard Lorenz curves for the two generations
intersect, with the sons' curve lying initially above the fathers' curve. The Lorenz curves behave
exactly as the theoretical results require, providing a simple illustration the purely demographic
component of intertemporal changes in inequality .
The results imply that intertemporal inequality comparisons in the presence of changing popu-
lation composition must be viewed with caution. Although the population may experience progres-
sive or regressive transfers which have a straightforward welfare interpretation and which themselves
produce unambiguous effects on Lorenz curves, contemporaneous changes in population composi-
tion may have confounding effects on the Lorenz curves which obscure the transfer effects and make
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Figure 1.
Generalized Lorenz curves for initial population, p 1@, entering population, P2 '2, and com-
bined population, p3I3, for a hypothetical case of two intersections in original curves.
16
Cumulative Share of Population
Figure 2.
Generalized Lorenz curves for Brazilian men aged 30-45, and for Brazilian boys aged 0-15
assigned income of father. (Source: 1976 PNAD)
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Figure 3.
Lorenz curves for Brazilian men aged 30-45, and for Brazilian boys aged 0-15 assigned income
of father. (Source: 1976 PNAD)
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